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This paper examines how beliefs about own HIV status aﬀect decisions to engage in
risky sexual behavior using data on married males living in Malawi. Risky behavior is
measured as the propensity to engage in extramarital aﬀairs. The empirical analysis
is based on panel surveys for years 2006 and 2008 from the Malawi Diﬀusion and
Ideational Change Project (MDICP). Beliefs vary signiﬁcantly over time in the data,
in part because of HIV testing and informational campaigns. We estimate the eﬀect of
beliefs about own HIV status on risky behavior using a panel data estimator developed
by Arellano and Carrasco (2003), which accommodates unobserved heterogeneity as
well as belief endogeneity arising from the dependence of current beliefs on lagged
behaviors. We ﬁnd that beliefs are an important determinant of risky behavior, with
downward revisions in the belief of being HIV positive increasing risky behavior and
upward revisions decreasing it. We modify Arellano and Carrasco’s (2003) estimator
to allow for underreporting of aﬀairs and ﬁnd the estimates to be relatively robust
to underreporting. Using our estimates and a prototypical epidemiological model of
disease transmission, we show that making individuals better informed about their
HIV status, either by increasing the credibility of test results and/or increasing access
to testing, would on net reduce the HIV transmission rate.1 Introduction
The AIDS epidemic imposes a large toll on populations in Sub-Saharan Africa through
high rates of mortality and morbidity. About two thirds of people infected with HIV
worldwide reside in the region, and several countries have adult prevalence rates
above 20% (UNAIDS, 2008). Heterosexual intercourse is known to be the main mode
of transmission in Africa, but relatively little is known about how the disease has in-
ﬂuenced sexual behaviors, if at all. Understanding the behavioral link is important to
developing eﬀective policy interventions, such as well targeted HIV testing programs
and informational campaigns, that aim to modify sexual behavior and ultimately
lower transmission rates.
This paper examines the extent to which sexual behavior of married men
in rural Malawi is inﬂuenced by their beliefs regarding their own HIV status. In
particular, we analyze their propensities to engage in one type of risky behavior:
extramarital aﬀairs. People who assign a high likelihood to being HIV-positive may
take more risks as they are already infected. On the other hand, the fear of infecting
others (via altruism or social norms or sanctions) might deter transmissive behaviors.
Similarly, people who assign a low likelihood to own infection may have a greater
incentive to take precautions to avoid infection, but may also take more risks because
of less concern about infecting others. Reducing the risky behavior of HIV-positive
persons generally reduces transmission rates. However, for HIV negative persons, the
relationship between risky behavior and transmission rates is less clear. As noted by
Kremer (1994) and Kremer and Morcom (1998), it is at least theoretically possible
that increasing risky behavior of HIV-negative persons improves the pool of potential
sex partners, which can lower transmission rates.
To prevent the further spread of HIV, government and nongovernmental orga-
nizations have implemented a variety of public health interventions, including increas-
ing access to testing and treatment services, informational campaigns, and condom
distribution programs. It is hoped that informing individuals about their own HIV
1status and about methods of avoiding transmission will reduce transmission rates,
although the quantitative evidence on behavioral responses is scarce. One study
by Thornton (2008), which is described in more detail in section two, ﬁnds that
individuals who picked up HIV test results in Malawi modestly increased condom
purchases but did not alter sexual behavior. There have been some related studies
of the relationship between sexual behavior and HIV prevalence rates. For example,
Oster (2007) ﬁnds little evidence that sexual behavior responds to local prevalence
rates using Demographic and Health Surveys data for a subset of African countries.
Her ﬁndings accord with earlier reported ﬁndings in Philipson and Posner (1995) for
the United States.1
Two ingredients are presumably necessary for a program intervention to eﬀec-
tively reduce HIV transmission. First, the intervention must alter individuals’ beliefs,
either about own HIV status, the HIV prevalence in their environment and/or about
the technology for transmission. Second, these changes in beliefs must induce changes
in behavior. At least in the context of rural Malawi, the link between interventions
such as HIV testing and beliefs has been tenuous. For example, consider Table 1,
which tabulates 2004 test results given to males in our MDICP analysis sample against
their reported likelihood of being HIV positive, elicited in 2006. One might expect
those who receive a positive test result to revise their belief of being positive upward
(perhaps to 100%) and those who receive a negative test outcome to revise their be-
lief downward. As shown in Table 1, however, the majority of individuals who tested
HIV positive in 2004 report a zero probability of being positive two years later. There
are also some individuals who test negative in 2004 but assign a high probability to
being positive two years later. Our evidence and additional evidence presented in
Delavande and Kohler (2009b) indicate that revisions in beliefs about own status do
not always accord with test results, although the reasons why some individuals seem
not to be convinced by the test results are not fully understood. The introduction of
1However, Oster ﬁnds some evidence that behavior responds to disease prevalence among the
subgroups of richer individuals and those with higher life expectancies.
2newer, rapid HIV testing methods that eliminate the lag time between testing and
delivery of test results and make it possible to quickly administer additional tests to
verify positive results will likely make beliefs more responsive to testing. 2
It is clear that many factors aﬀect the process by which individuals form
beliefs about their HIV status. But even if an intervention is successful in inﬂuencing
beliefs, it will not be eﬀective unless the change in beliefs also modiﬁes behavior
in a way that is conducive to reducing HIV transmission. The focus of this paper
is on analyzing how beliefs inﬂuence sexual behavior, using a unique panel survey
called the Malawi Diﬀusion and Ideational Change Project (MDICP) dataset, and on
exploring to what extent making people better informed about their HIV status can
bring about decreases in the HIV transmission rate.3 The MDICP sample covers rural
populations from three diﬀerent regions in Malawi, where the HIV prevalence rate
is approximately 7%. Our analysis focusses on on men, who are much more likely
than women to report having extramarital aﬀairs. Concurrent sexual partnerships
are fairly common. The MDICP survey is unusual in that it includes measures of
individuals’ reported beliefs about their own and their spouse’s HIV status as well
as information on whether they engaged in risky behaviors. There is also substantial
variation in beliefs over time, in part because of testing services that were ﬁrst made
available in 2004 and then again in 2006 and 2008. Our empirical analysis in based
2There is anecdotal evidence that some MDICP respondents were skeptical about the quality of
the tests, which was likely exacerbated by the initial delay of one or more months in providing the
2004 test results. There are a few other reasons why beliefs may not accord with the test results.
First, HIV positive individuals are typically asymptomatic for many years and may therefore not
believe that they carry the disease, particularly in the earlier years of data collection when HIV
testing was less prevalent. The reported belief of being positive in 2006 despite the negative test
result in 2004 could also reﬂect interim risky behavior. Although in theory part of this may be
ascribed to “prosecutor’s fallacy”, in actuality the testing protocol required a second test whenever
a positive result was obtained and a third test whenever the ﬁrst and second tests were discordant.
This induced a very low probability of a false positive.
3The PIs of the MDICP data collection and testing project were Susan Watkins and Hans-Peter
Kohler.
3on data from the 2006 and 2008 survey waves, which collected the most detailed
measures on beliefs (described below).
Of key concern in any analysis of the relationship between sexual behavior
and beliefs is the potential for endogeneity, arising from correlations between past
behavior and current beliefs. In such cases, both cross-section and within estimators
(in linear models) are biased. For this reason, we use a semiparametric panel data
estimator developed by Arellano and Carrasco (2003), which accommodates potential
feedback of lagged behavior on current beliefs (a violation of strict exogeneity in a
panel data setting) as well as unobservable heterogeneity. We also report estimates
based on a modiﬁed version of the Arellano-Carrasco (2003) estimator, developed in
this paper, that allows for potential under-reporting of risky behaviors, building on
the insights of Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998).
We use the estimated dynamic panel data model to perform counterfactual
experiments that simulate behavior in an environment where individuals are bet-
ter informed about their HIV status, either because test results are more credible
and/or because more people get tested. Using a prototypical Susceptible-Infective
(SI) epidemiological model exposited in Hyman et al. [21], we simulate the eﬀects of
changing beliefs on the transmission rate. The simulation results show that making
the population better informed about HIV status leads on net to a reduction in the
transmission rate. Interestingly, our empirical ﬁndings provide some support for the
theoretical mechanism described in Kremer (1994) and Kremer and Morcom (1998).
Although HIV-negative individuals increase their number of sexual partners, their in-
creased risk exposure is oﬀset by an overall reduction in the probability of a random
partner being HIV-positive. That is, the sexual partner pool improves by a reduction
in transmissive behavior by HIV-positive individuals and by increased engagement of
HIV-negative individuals.
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 summarizes some of the existing
empirical literature on the relationship between beliefs about HIV, testing, and risky
behaviors. Section 3 presents a simple two period model for exploring the determi-
4nants of risky behavior. The model illustrates that the net eﬀect of changing beliefs
on risk-taking is theoretically ambiguous, so whether beliefs aﬀect behavior and to
what extent is largely an empirical question. Section 4 presents our empirical strat-
egy for estimating the causal eﬀect of beliefs about own HIV status on risk-taking
behaviors in a way that takes into account the predeterminedness of beliefs and un-
observed heterogeneity. Section 5 describes the empirical results, which indicate
that beliefs about own HIV status aﬀect the propensity to engage in extra-marital
aﬀairs. Notably, individuals who revise their beliefs upward curtail risky behavior
whereas individuals who revise beliefs downward increase risky behavior. Section 5
also considers the problem of measurement error in reported extra-marital aﬀairs,
where the measurement error is potentially nonclassical and non-mean-zero (in our
case, underreporting of aﬀairs). Section 6 presents simulations of how changing beliefs
aﬀects the population HIV transmission rate. Section 7.
2 Related Literature
The notion that individuals change their behavior in response to communicable dis-
eases is generally well accepted and there is an interesting theoretical literature that
explores the general equilibrium implications of this type of behavioral response. An
early example is Kremer (1996), who presents a model where behavior is allowed to
vary with prevalence.4 In his model, the probability of infection is a function of the
number of partners, the transmission rate and the disease prevalence. Kremer shows
that those with relatively few partners respond to higher prevalence levels by reduc-
ing their sexual activity, because higher prevalence makes the marginal partner more
“expensive.” Interestingly, Kremer’s model leads to a fatalistic behavior for those
with a suﬃciently high initial number of partners.5
4Earlier models of disease transmission typically do not allow prevalence to aﬀect behavior, which
is often encoded by a contact parameter that is assumed to be exogenous.
5For those individuals, an increase in prevalence may reduce the probability of infection from the
marginal partner (even though the risk of contagion from the ﬁrst few partners increases), leading
5Philipson (2000) surveys alternative theoretical frameworks of how behavior
responds to disease prevalence. These include models of assortative matching (HIV-
positives matching with HIV-positives and HIV-negatives with HIV negatives), which
are shown to have a dampening eﬀect on the spread of the disease (Dow and Philipson,
1996); models that relate prevalence rates and the demand for vaccination; models
for the optimal timing of public health interventions in the presence of elastic behav-
ior; and, of particular relevance to our study, models for studying the implications
of information acquisition (testing) for asymptomatic diseases such as HIV. In an-
other recent theoretical study, Mechoulan (2004) examines how testing could lead to
increased sexual behavior of selﬁsh individuals that turn out to be HIV-positive. He
shows that without a suﬃcient fraction of altruistic individuals, testing can increase
disease incidence.6
As previously noted, Thornton (2008) provides a recent empirical study exam-
ining the causal impact of receiving HIV test results on risky behavior using a subset
of the 2004 round of the MDICP data that participated in the 2004 HIV testing.7
At the time of administering the tests, the MDICP project team also carried out a
social experiment that randomized incentives to pick up the test results.8 Thornton
(2008) analyzes data generated from this incentives experiment along with data from
a two month follow-up survey that she administered to study how picking up the test
results aﬀects condom purchases and risky sexual behavior. Using the randomized
incentive as an instrument for picking up the results, she ﬁnds that learning the re-
to an increase in the optimal number of partners.
6This phenomenon is sometimes referred in this literature as the Philipson-Posner conjecture (see
Philipson and Posner (1993)).
7In 2006 and 2008, the MDICP team again oﬀered individuals the opportunity to get tested, this
time with an improved testing procedure (rapid response blood tests rather than the oral swabs used
in 2004) that eliminated the time delay between testing and test results. Another diﬀerence is that
all individuals tested received their results. In 2006, almost everyone (93.6%) elected to get tested
and receive the results, as further discussed in section 5 below.
8The incentive amounts ranged from no incentives to incentives of 300 Kwachas, which is ap-
proximately a few days wage of a laborer.
6sult modestly increases condom purchases but does not alter sexual behavior. It
is possible, though, that the two month period that elapsed between the incentives
experiment and the follow-up survey may have been too short to observe substantial
changes in sexual behavior.9 Thornton also documents that individuals who tested
negative generally revised their subjective beliefs about being HIV positive downward
and that those who tested positive did not signiﬁcantly revise their beliefs.
Our study diﬀers from Thornton’s in a number of dimensions, including (i)
a focus on identifying the causal relationship between beliefs and behavior for the
larger sample of MDICP male respondents rather than the causal eﬀect of picking up
test results for the subsample of those who got tested, (ii) the use of data gathered
in the 2006 and 2008 rounds that contain more detailed measures on beliefs, and (iii)
the use of a diﬀerent modeling framework and estimation methodology.
Another related paper is Boozer and Philipson (2000), which analyzes the re-
lationship between HIV status, testing and risky behavior using data from the San
Francisco Home Health Study. Our identiﬁcation strategy for estimating the eﬀects
of changes in beliefs on behavior is similar in that we also make use of belief informa-
tion gathered in two diﬀerent time periods, where individuals had the opportunity to
get tested in the intervening period. In the SFHHS survey all individuals who were
unaware of their status (around 70%) were tested immediately after the ﬁrst wave
of interviews and learned their status. Boozer and Philipson use those who already
knew their status, the remaining 30%, as a control group and ﬁnd that belief revi-
sions towards a lower probability of a positive status increase sexual activity. That
is, individuals who considered themselves highly likely to be infected and discover
9
Another relevant consideration is that if there were heterogeneity of response to the randomized
incentives, then the IV estimate that Thornton (2008) reports would have the LATE interpretation.
Under this interpretation, the estimate corresponds to the causal eﬀect of picking up test results
for the subset of the sample who would not have picked up the results without the incentive. See
Imbens and Angrist (1994) and more recently Heckman and Urzua (2009) for discussions of the
LATE interpretation of IV estimates.
7they are not increase the number of partners and those who believe themselves to
be relatively unlikely to be infected and discover otherwise reduce their number of
partners.10 Our empirical ﬁndings are similar to those of Boozer and Philipson’s,
although the population we study, which consists of married males in Subsaharan
African, could potentially have diﬀerent behavioral responses from those of the pre-
dominantly homosexual San Francisco population that Boozer and Philipson analyze.
Our estimation approach also diﬀers from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy used
by Boozer and Philipson.
Other related papers in the epidemiology literature ﬁnd little or mixed evi-
dence of behavioral response to HIV testing (see, for example, Higgins et al. (1991),
Ickovics et al. (1994), Wenger et al. (1991) and Wenger et al. (1992)). An exception is
Weinhardt et al. (1999), who note that “the heterogeneity of eﬀect sizes ...suggest[s]
that participants’ responses to HIV-CT [(HIV counseling and testing)] are multiply
determined and complex. However, with only a few exceptions, HIV-CT studies
have not been informed by theories of behavior change,”p.1402). In a recent paper,
Wilson (2008) estimates the eﬀects of antiretroviral therapy (ART) provision on the
decision to get tested using data from Zambia. He ﬁnds that most of the eﬀect of
ART is concentrated on individuals attaching low prior probabilities of HIV infection.
Wilson interprets these ﬁndings as evidence of a non-random selection mechanism for
the allocation of ART in Zambia.
Delavande and Kohler (2007) use the MDICP dataset to study the accuracy
of individuals’ reported expectations of being HIV positive. They provide detailed
documentation of the method used in the MDICP surveys to elicit the probabilistic
expectations that we use in our empirical analysis. They ﬁnd that the probability
assessments on HIV infection gathered in the 2006 round of the survey are remarkably
well calibrated to local community prevalence rates.11 Anglewicz and Kohler (2005)
10The authors caution that the latter result nevertheless relies on the behavior of only ﬁve indi-
viduals in their sample.
11For the 2004 wave of the MDICP data, the likelihood of own infection is reported only in broader
8point out that individuals in the 2004 wave, however, seem to over-estimate the risk
of being infected. 10% of husbands and 18% of wives estimate a medium or high
likelihood of current infection while actual prevalence in 2004 was lower: 6% for men
and 9% for women. In reconciling the evidence from the 2004 survey with the well-
calibrated probabilistic assessments in the later wave, Delavande and Kohler note
problems of interpersonal comparability of the coarse belief categories and that, even
if anchoring techniques are used (such as vignettes), complications would still remain
in translating the coarse categories into more precise assessments. In this paper, we
make use of both the coarse belief categories and the ﬁner measurements, further
described in section four.
3 A Model of Risky Behavior Choices
The focus of this paper is on how individual’s beliefs about own HIV status aﬀect risk-
taking behaviors in an environment where beliefs are changing over time. As noted
in the introduction, theoretical models that have been put forth in the literature are
usually ambiguous as to the sign of the eﬀect of changes in beliefs about one’s own HIV
status on risk-taking behaviors. On the one hand, downward revisions in beliefs, as
may arise from learning a negative test result, should increase the expected length of
life and thereby increase the beneﬁts from risk avoidance. On the other hand, learning
a test result might also be informative about the technology for HIV transmission.
In our sample, individuals tend to overestimate the probability of becoming infected
by HIV from one sexual encounter with an infected person and learning that they
are negative despite a past life of risky behavior could increase their willingness to
take risks.12 Altruism also plays an important role in HIV transmission, as people
categories (whether an individual thinks it highly likely, likely, unlikely or not at all possible that
he or she is HIV positive).
12The probability is thought to be about 0.1% (see Gray et al (2001)).This channel is not in
the model we present here. Individuals in the survey do not seem to revise their beliefs about the
probability of infection from one sexual encounter substantially from 2004 to 2006. This channel is
9who are altruistic towards others would be expected to curtail risky behaviors after
an upward revision in beliefs. Other factors that may reduce transmissive behavior
are social or legal sanctions imposed on HIV positive individuals.
To explore the relationship between beliefs on own HIV status and sexual
behavior, we next present a simple two period model. It assumes that individuals
choose their level of risky behavior in the ﬁrst period and update their beliefs on own
HIV status in a Bayesian way. Let ˜ Y0 ∈ R denote an individual’s chosen level of
risky sexual behavior (risky behavior represents activities such as having unprotected
sex or engaging in extramarital aﬀairs). The probability of infection is an increasing
function of risky behavior and we denote it by g(˜ Y0) ∈ [0,1].13 To be sure, other
factors such as the prevalence rate in the community modulate the link between
sexual behavior and the likelihood of infection and could be incorporated into the
function g(·). We abstract from such inﬂuences here for ease of presentation, but
the empirical analysis includes conditioning variables intended to hold constant local
prevalence rates. Let B0 denote the individual’s prior belief about his own HIV
status. Individuals potentially obtain satisfaction from risky sexual behaviors in the
ﬁrst period. We also allow one’s perception on HIV status to directly aﬀect utility:
U(˜ Y0,B0). How beliefs aﬀect the marginal utility of risky behavior can be regarded as
a measure of altruism or the degree to which social sanctions on transmissive behavior
by HIV-positive individuals aﬀect the utility of sexual intensity. In the second period,
individuals receive a “lump-sum ”utility ﬂow equal to U, but this is reduced by λU if
an individual contracts HIV in the ﬁrst period. λ can be interpreted as the mortality
rate for an HIV-positive individual. The discount factor is β. Beliefs are updated in
a Bayesian way. The belief of being HIV positive in the second period (B1) depend
on previous period beliefs (B0) plus the probability of having contracted the disease
nevertheless allowed to operate in our empirical analysis.
13The probability of infection may be the perceived probability of infection. In a multiperiod
context, this belief may also be updated through time but we take it as predetermined when the
risky behavior decision is taken. In our dataset, the average reported belief about infection from a
single sexual encounter is not statistically diﬀerent across the two waves.
10last period:
B1 = B0 + (1 − B0)g(˜ Y0) (1)
The individual’s problem is then
max
˜ Y0




{U(˜ Y0,B0) + β(1 − λB0 − λ(1 − B0)g(˜ Y0))U}.
The ﬁrst order condition yields:
U1(˜ Y0,B0) − βλ(1 − B0)g
′(˜ Y0)U = 0 (2)
where U1(·,·) denotes the derivative of U(·,·) with respect to its ﬁrst argument. This




U12(˜ Y0,B0) + βλg′(˜ Y0)U
U11(˜ Y0,B0) − βλ(1 − B0)g′′(˜ Y0)U
which, given a concave (in ˜ Y0) utility function, is positive if U12(˜ Y0,B0)+βλg′(˜ Y0)U >
0 and g′′(˜ Y0) > 0. The latter is reasonable if the probability of infection g(˜ Y0) is low
(take for instance g(·) to be a logistic or normal cdf and consider the low rates of
transmission per sexual act). If an individual’s marginal utility from (risky) sexual
behavior is insensitive to his or her perception on HIV status (that is, not altruistic or
amenable to social sanctions if HIV-positive), U12(˜ Y0,B0) + βλg′(˜ Y0)U = βλg′(˜ Y0)U
which is positive. As long as one’s marginal utility does not decrease much (relative
to βλU), higher prior beliefs are associated with riskier behaviors. A person who
is not altruistic (i.e. U12(·) = 0) would be expected to increase risky behavior upon
learning a positive test result and to decrease risky behavior upon learning a negative
test result. Intuitively, if one is already infected, sexual behavior poses no further
risks while still providing utility.
In a multi-period context, beliefs aﬀect current behavior and respond to past
behavior through updating. Prior belief B0 is based at least in part on previous
11choices regarding ˜ Y0. As described in the next section, dependence of beliefs on
previous behavior poses challenges in estimation, because it leads to a potential lack
of strict exogeneity in a panel data model. Another potential source of endogeneity
arises from any unobservable traits that aﬀect both beliefs B0 and behavior ˜ Y0.
4 Empirical Framework
As noted in the introduction, we aim to assess whether and to what extent changes
in beliefs about own HIV status aﬀect risk-taking behaviors. The behavioral model
developed in the previous section implies a decision rule for risky behavior that de-
pends on beliefs about own HIV status (see equation (2)). Our empirical speciﬁcation
of the decision rule introduces additional covariates to allow for time-varying deter-
minants of behavior, such as age. It also controls for time invariant determinants
by incorporating correlated random eﬀects. Time invariant determinants may in-
clude religiosity, education, local prevalence rates (which were roughly constant over
the 2006-2008 time period we study), and individual or region speciﬁc costs of risky
sexual behavior.14
We next describe the nonlinear panel data estimation strategy used to control
for endogeneity of beliefs and for (correlated) unobservable heterogeneity. Let ˜ Yit
denote the actual measure of risk taking behavior of individual i in period t, which
in our data is an indicator for whether the individual engaged in extra marital aﬀairs
over the previous 12 months.15 Denote by Yit the reported measure of risk taking
14As described below in section 5.2, our sample covers three geographic regions that have cultural
and economic diﬀerences, including diﬀerences in religiosity, polygamous practices and wealth.
15Other measures of risky behavior could in principle be used, but would require diﬀerent method-
ologies. For example, considering the number of extra-marital aﬀairs instead of an indicator function
for any aﬀair would require a ﬁxed eﬀects model for censored count data. To our knowledge, existing
methodologies for such frameworks require strict exogeneity, an inappropriate assumption for beliefs
in this context. A possible alternative measure of risky behavior is condom use, but it is not avail-
able for 2008 in the survey. Previous work ﬁnds that condom use, though not condom purchase, is
relatively inelastic in Malawi).
12behavior of individual i in period t. Below, we allow for misreporting in the variable
˜ Yit so ˜ Yit and Yit may diﬀer with positive probability. Bit denotes an individuals’
beliefs at time t about their own HIV status, measured on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0
being no likelihood of being positive and 1 being HIV positive with certainty.
The empirical speciﬁcation can be written as:
˜ Yit = 1[α + βBit + γXit + uit ≥ 0]. (3)
Following Arellano and Carrasco (2003), we impose the following ﬁxed eﬀect error
decomposition:
uit = fi + vit
where vit is an idiosyncratic shock and fi is a time invariant eﬀect that is potentially
correlated with the included covariates.
In the previously described behavioral model, current beliefs about HIV status
depend on prior beliefs and last period behaviors through updating (equation (1)):
Bit − Bit−1 = (1 − Bit−1)g(˜ Yit−1)
where ˜ Yit−1 is a function of fi and vit−1 (equation (3)). This updating implies a
potential correlation between Bit and ˜ Yit−1, and therefore between Bit , vit−1 and fi,
which amounts to a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption that is often invoked
in panel data settings. An advantage of the Arellano and Carrasco (2003) estimator is
that it only requires weak exogeneity and not strict exogeneity. Following Arellano










where Λ(·) is the standard logistic distribution and E(fi|W t
i) is its mean.16 No re-
strictions are imposed on the shape of the conditional mean function. W t
i is a vector
16The logistic distribution is not essential and can be replaced by any other known distribution (we
adopt a logistic distribution as in Arellano and Carrasco’s simulations and empirical application).
A normal distribution delivers essentially the same results as those presented here. The framework
13that assembles previous and current values of Bit and Xit and past values of Yit. In
our case, W t
















i) can be easily estimated in the data as our covariates have discrete sup-































By the Law of Iterated Expectations,
E(ǫit|W
t−1
i ) = 0.
This conditional moment restriction can be used to construct a moment-based esti-
mator for the parameters of interest. In the case of covariates with ﬁnite support, the
conditional moments above are equivalent to the following unconditional moments
(see Chamberlain, (1987)):
E[Zitǫit] = 0
where Zit is a vector of dummy variables, each corresponding to a cell for W
t−1
i . Arel-





















also accommodates a time varying scale parameter as long as a normalization is imposed for one of
the periods. The distribution can be made totally nonparametric if there are continuous covariates
as noted in the article (see their footnote 7).
14for t = 2,...,T. The estimator is asymptotically normal and its asymptotic variance,
taking into account the estimation of h, can be obtained by conventional methods for
multistage estimation problems (see for example Newey and McFadden (1994)).
For our weighting matrix we use 1/N
PN
i=1 ZitZ′
it, which is a diagonal matrix
giving more weight to the cells that have more individuals.17 To handle the cases
in which ˆ h is 0 or 1, we adopt a slight modiﬁcation of Cox’s (1970) small sample





1 − p + (100n)−1
￿
.
The conventional small-sample adjustment uses (2n)−1 instead of (100n)−1 above and
is employed by Arellano and Carrasco in their paper. The former is chosen so that
the asymptotic bias is o(n−1) (see Cox (1970), pp.33-4), but is inadequate when some
cells are relatively small. In our case, a change in cell size from 2006 to 2008 without
a change in the proportion of reported extra-marital aﬀairs would generate variation
in F −1(   ht(W t
i)) − F −1(   ht(W
t−1
i )) for smaller cells. To mitigate the inﬂuence of these
variations on our estimator, we replace (2n)−1 by (100n)−1. With this modiﬁcation,
the asymptotic bias is O(n−1) (though not o(n−1)).
As mentioned previously and further described below, we have access to both
detailed quantitative (in categories 0-10 reﬂecting a probability of 0-1) and cruder
categorical data (measured in categories no likelihood, low, medium or high likeli-
hood)on individuals beliefs about their own HIV infection. We used both of these
belief measures to form moments for the GMM estimation. We avoid splitting the
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.
17Arellano and Carrasco suggest using the inverse of this matrix, which would put more weight
on the smaller cells. We conjecture that the inverse weighting matrix was a type-setting error and
that the intended weighting is the usual GMM weighting that gives more weight to cells with lower
variance.
15The vector lit−1 contains dummies for the categorical belief variables in 2006 (no like-
lihood, low, medium or high likelihood). Finally, as in Arellano and Carrasco (2003),
we assume that E(fi) = 0 and obtain two additional moments (one for each year),
which allow us to estimate the constant term α.
To facilitate the interpretation of the estimated parameters, we also present
the eﬀects of belief changes from B′ to B′′ on behavior:
∆t(B
′,B
′′) ≡ P(α + βB
′′ + γXit + uit ≥ 0) − P(α + βB
















These are computed as in Arellano and Carrasco (2003), replacing population expec-
tations and parameters by sample averages and estimates. In particular,
  E(fi|W t
i) = Λ
−1(   ht(W t
i)) − ˆ α − ˆ βB
′′ − ˆ γXit.
As in that paper, we note that this marginal eﬀect measures the direct eﬀect of beliefs
on behavior, abstracting from any additional indirect eﬀects that arise via its inﬂu-
ence on E(fi|W t
i) (similar considerations are also discussed in Chamberlain (1984)
(pp.1272-4)). In our case, the individual eﬀect absorbs elements such as tribal aﬃli-
ation, cultural and other time-invariant socio-demographic categories that (although
correlated) are unlikely to respond to a change in beliefs.
Finally, we also consider the possibility of misreporting in the data in our
robustness analysis. In particular, we allow for the possibility that some fraction of
individuals who engage in risky behavior report that they do not and explore how
varying degrees of misreporting aﬀect our estimates. To this end, we adapt ideas
developed by Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) to the Arellano-Carrasco
(2003) framework to allow for misreporting of ˜ Yit . We assume that individuals
always report truthfully when they do not engage in extra-marital aﬀairs and with a
probability α1 lie about having an extra-marital aﬀair. Thus,
P(Yit = 1|˜ Yit = 0) = 0 P(Yit = 0|˜ Yit = 1) = α1.
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Using the Law of Iterated Expectations, we again obtain estimation moments for
the parameters of interest.18 In our robustness analysis, we report estimates for the
coeﬃcients of interest with varying degrees of misclassiﬁcation.
5 Data and Empirical Results
5.1 Background on the MDICP Dataset
The MDICP data were gathered by the Malawi Research Group.19 The Malaw-
ian population is composed of more than 20 diﬀerent ethnic groups with diﬀerent
customs, languages and religious practices. Malawi’s three diﬀerent administrative
regions (North, Center and South) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in several aspects that
are potentially relevant to our analysis. The MDICP gathers information from ﬁve
rounds of a longitudinal survey (1998, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008) that together contain
18One important problem in implementation is that
\ ht(W t
i )
1−α1 may be above one in small samples.








19The data collection was funded by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Develop-
ment (NICHD), grants R01-HD044228-01, R01-HD050142, R01-HD37276 and R01-HD/MH-41713-
0. The MDICP has also been funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, grant RF-99009#199. Susan
Watkins was the PI for the last three grants. Hans-Peter Kohler was the PI for the ﬁrst two. Detailed
information on this survey can be obtained at http://www.malawi.pop.upenn.edu/.
17extensive information on sexual behavior and socio-economic background on more
than 2,500 men and women. We use the later two rounds of the survey that include
detailed information on beliefs about own HIV status. Also, we only analyze data on
married men, who are much more likely to report extramarital aﬀairs than women.
The MDICP survey contains information on sexual relations, risk assessments, mar-
riage and partnership histories, household rosters and transfers as well as income and
other measures of wealth. The data also include information on village-level variables
as well as regional market prices and weather related variables. Recent studies on
the quality of this dataset have validated it as a reasonably representative sample
of rural Malawi (see, for instance, Anglewicz et al. (2006)). Appendix A provides
further information about the dataset.
The MDICP dataset measured beliefs about own HIV status using two dif-
ferent measurement instruments. In the 2004, 2006 and 2008 surveys, individuals
were asked to choose one of four categories: no likelihood, low likelihood, medium
likelihood and high likelihood. In the 2006 and 2008 surveys, the categorical mea-
sure was supplemented with a probability measure. One might be concerned that
low education populations would have diﬃculty in reporting a probability measure.
For this reason, the MDICP survey used a novel bean counting approach to elicit
probabilities where these were measured on a 0-10 bean scale where more beans for
a particular event correspond to a higher probability assessment for that event (see
Appendix for details).20 Delavande and Kohler (2009a) study both the categorical
and more continuous measure and demonstrate that the continuous measure is well
calibrated to regional HIV rates.
20Individuals were ﬁrst given examples of how to represent the likelihood of common events using
0-10 beans, such as the chance of having rain the next day, and then asked to report the likelihood
of being HIV positive using the bean measure.
185.2 Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviations for the variables used in our analysis.
The total sample size is 485 married men for whom data were collected in both the
2006 and 2008 rounds of the survey.21 The average age of the sample is 46 in the
2008 round. The sample resides in three regions of Malawi: Balaka (South), Rumphi
(North) and Mchinji (Center). Although the original sample was designed to include
about equal numbers of respondents from each of the three districts, the share of
men from Balaka drops in later waves both in the full MDICP data and our analysis
subsample. In our subsample, 36% of the men are from Rumphi, about 33% from
Mchinji, and about 31% from Balaka. The explanation for the higher attrition in
Balaka is higher rates of migration typical to the area.
The diﬀerent characteristics of the three administrative regions of Malawi are
evident in our sample. Across the three regions, the predominant religion is Chris-
tianity (73.6%) with the remainder Muslim (23.0%) and a small percentage reporting
other religions or no religion. Most of the overall sample has only some primary
schooling (71.5%), with 10.5% never attending school and 16.5% having some sec-
ondary schooling. About 15.9% of the sample are polygamous; the polygamy rate
for 2006 in Rumphi is higher than that in Balaka and Mchinji, with about 24% in
Rumphi, 19% in Balaka and 11% in Mchinji. Muslims represent about two thirds of
the Balaka sub-sample but are less than 2% in the other two sites. Balaka has the
highest percentage of respondents who never attended school and the lowest percent-
age of respondent with some secondary schooling. Rumphi has the lowest rate for
respondents without any schooling, and the highest rate of respondents with some
secondary schooling. Owning a metal roof (as opposed to thatch, which is most
commonly used), is an indicator of wealth in rural Malawi. Rumphi has the highest
21Because our analysis relates to extramarital aﬀairs, we restrict the sample to men who were
married in both rounds. We include men who may have been married to diﬀerent women in the two
years. In the sample there were 72 single men in 2006 and 57 in 2008. Of those, 4 were single in
both waves.
19percentage of respondents residing in a dwelling with a metal roof, at 27%, while
Balaka and Mchinji both have 17%. In addition, individuals nationwide are mainly
aﬃliated with three tribes and speak a variety of local languages. Finally, individuals
in our sample have on average between ﬁve and six children and 35% report that they
desire more children.
Table 2 also reports the average own beliefs about being HIV positive in 2006
and 2008 and the average reported beliefs about the spouse. In 2006, 82.0% report
that they have close to zero chance of being HIV positive. In 2008, the percentage
in this category decreases to 54.0%. In 2006, 4.6% of individuals believed that they
had a medium or high chance of being HIV positive, but this percentage increases
to 10.1% in 2006. Figure 1 depicts the change in the belief distribution over time,
which is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being no likelihood and 10 being
perfect certainty. As seen in the ﬁgure, the belief distribution is shifting towards
higher beliefs between 2006 and 2008.
As seen in Table 2, in 2006 the average number of beans representing the belief
that one’s spouse is HIV positive is 0.62, in comparison to 1.38 in 2008 (on a scale of
0 to 10 beans). Even though individuals were not informed about their spouse’s test
result for conﬁdentiality reasons (if their spouse got tested), about 96% of the wives
report voluntarily sharing their test results with their husbands in our sample.22
In Table 3, we examine how the continuous belief measure (the bean measure)
varies within the coarser subjective belief categories. For 2006, people who report
their infection probability as being in the low category choose a number of beans
corresponding to a 17.2% average probability. The bean average for the medium cat-
egory corresponds to a 44.8% probability and the bean average for the high category
to a 76.7% probability.
With regard to risky behaviors, 4.3% reported having an extramarital aﬀair
in the last 12 months in 2006 in comparison with 10.5% in 2008. Table 4 examines
the temporal pattern in extramarital aﬀairs. 86.2% of the sample does not report
22Categorical belief variables about spouse’s HIV status were not collected in 2008.
20having an aﬀair in either 2006 or 2008, 3.3% reports having an aﬀair in 2006 but not
in 2008, and 9.5% report having an aﬀair in 2008 but not in 2006. About 1.0% report
engaging in extramarital relations in both 2006 and 2008. As previously noted, HIV
testing was oﬀered in 2004, 2006 and 2008. 93.6% of the sample was tested in 2006,
in comparison with 83% tested in 2004 and 82.9% in 2008. The majority (68.9%)
got tested in all three years.23 Eight individuals (1.6%) got tested only in 2004 (of
which only ﬁve picked up the results in 2004), 4.7% took the test only in 2006 and
less than 1% took it only in 2008. Among those tested in 2006, 3.8% tested positive,
and in 2008, 5.0% tested positive. It is interesting to note that 8 individuals tested
positive in 2004 and picked up their results at that time, but nonetheless decided to
get tested again in 2006 and 2008.
Table 5 explores the potential determinants of decisions about extramarital
aﬀairs using cross-sectional analysis applied to 2006 data. A probit regression of an
indicator for extra-marital aﬀairs on beliefs and other covariates shows that beliefs are
a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of aﬀairs. People who assign a higher probability
of themselves being HIV positive are more likely to report engaging in extramari-
tal aﬀairs. In the cross-section, the reported probability of being HIV positive also
decreases with age. These correlations do not have a causal interpretation though,
because they do not account for unobserved heterogeneity or for the potential endo-
geneity of beliefs. Because the individual eﬀect fi positively aﬀects the likelihood that
yi,t−1 is positive and this in turn positively aﬀects beliefs by increasing the probability
of infection since the last period, beliefs and the residual are positively associated, in-
troducing an expected upward bias in the estimation. Indeed, our estimates reported
below show that when the endogeneity is taken into account the relation between
behavior and beliefs is reversed. It should be noted that a simple within estimator
would also have biases even in a linear model (see, for instance, Bond (2002)). The
methodology we use, that was suggested by Arellano and Carrasco (2003), allows us
to handle the endogeneity properly.
23The individuals who got repeatedly tested had all picked up their test results in 2004.
215.3 Estimated Causal Eﬀects
We next report estimates based on model (3) using the Arellano and Carrasco (2003)
methodology and generalized method of moments, as described in section 4. The
estimation requires that we construct cells based on W
t−1
i , which includes lagged belief
measures and age. In principle, cells could be constructed separately for all possible
values of the discrete covariates, but in practice this procedure would lead to many
small cells that are imprecisely estimated. For this reason, we aggregate some of the
cell categories and, following the recommendation in Arellano and Carrasco, exclude
in estimation very small cells (consisting of one or two individuals). Speciﬁcally, we
deﬁne the cells by ﬁrst dividing individuals into age quintiles bins and also according
to aggregated belief categories. We consider the following two belief aggregations:
0,1,2-10 beans and 0,1,2-4,5-10 beans. Although the cells are deﬁned based on
aggregate categories, we use the disaggregated age and belief variables in forming the
diﬀerence Λ−1 (ht(W t





− β∆Bit−1 − γ∆Xit−1.
Tables 6a and 6b show the cell sizes for the two alternative bean aggregation
schemes. In the ﬁrst scheme, we discard ﬁve cells and 6 individuals and use in
estimation 23 cells and 479 individuals. For the second scheme, we discard seven cells
and nine individuals and use in estimation 27 cells and 476 observations. Once we
append the four moments from the categorical belief variables and the two moments
for the levels (see section 4), we obtain a total of 29 and 33 moments, respectively.




i in the upper diagonal
block and an identity in the lower diagonal block.
Tables 7a-b report the estimated coeﬃcients obtained for two diﬀerent speci-
ﬁcations (each table reports estimates for a diﬀerent speciﬁcation). All the speciﬁ-
cations include linear terms in beliefs and age. The second speciﬁcation also includes
quadratic terms in age and beliefs. The estimates indicate that the impact of beliefs is
statistically signiﬁcant and that people reporting higher beliefs of being HIV positive
22are less likely to engage in extramarital aﬀairs.24
For ease of interpretation, Tables 8a-b report the marginal eﬀects of changes in
beliefs (indicated in the table) on the probability of engaging in extramarital aﬀairs.
The estimates imply that revising beliefs upward decreases risk-taking. For example,
an individual who changes beliefs from 4 beans to 10 beans would decrease the prob-
ability of having an extramarital aﬀair by 2.4 percentage points in 2006 according
to the linear speciﬁcation and the 0,1,2-10 bean aggregation (see Table 8a). The
estimates also indicate that individuals who revise their beliefs downward increase
risk-taking. For example, someone who decreases their belief from 2 beans to zero
increases the probability of an extra-marital aﬀair by 8.5 percentage points in 2006
(again for the linear speciﬁcation and 0,1,2-10 aggregation of beans). These estimates
suggest that HIV testing programs that inform individuals of their negative status
and lead to a downward revision in beliefs induce an increase in risk-taking.25
5.4 Robustness
5.4.1 Misreporting
Because many of the surveyed topics concern sensitive issues, an obvious concern
is the potential for misreporting. In this subsection, we explore the robustness of
the previously estimated speciﬁcation to allowing for measurement error in extra-
marital aﬀairs. To investigate the potential problem of misreporting, the MDICP
team carried a small set of qualitative interviews with men that had reported not
having extramarital aﬀairs during the 1998 round of the survey, when slightly over
24A joint test of the statistical signiﬁcance of the belief variables shows that they are statistically
signiﬁcant at a 5% level for the second speciﬁcation.
25If we estimated a linear probability speciﬁcation without instrumenting, we get similar results.
However, using TSLS and using lagged beliefs as instruments, the coeﬃcient estimates on beliefs are
generally insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. With a binary outcome variable, however, the linear
probability model would not properly diﬀerence away the individual eﬀect except in the special case
of a uniform error distribution on uit,
239% of the interviews admitted to having had extra-marital aﬀairs. These follow-up
interviews were very casual (no questionnaire or clipboard, typically no tape recorder)
and were later transcribed by the principal investigators in the ﬁeld.26 Many of those
who had originally denied inﬁdelity, admitted otherwise in these informal interviews.
Even though the reference period in the 1998 survey was longer and the men may
tend to exaggerate in these casual conversations, this provides some evidence of some
underreporting by the respondents during the more formal interviews.
To assess the impact of underreporting on our estimation results, we re-
estimated the model for diﬀerent assumed levels of misreporting, using the adapted
version of Arellano and Carrasco’s estimator that was described in section 4. The
results are shown in Tables 9a and 9b for the alternative speciﬁcations and bean
aggregation levels and for varying levels of misreporting. The ﬁrst row displays the
estimates presented in our main analysis (i.e. without misreporting) and subsequent
rows display the estimates for higher levels of misreporting (α1). We ﬁnd that higher
levels of misreporting lead to higher coeﬃcient magnitudes.
To gain intuition for why misreporting leads to an attenuation bias in the esti-
mated coeﬃcients, consider for simplicity a linear model. Under linearity, E(Y |X) =
((1 − α1)β)′X and the estimated parameters are attenuated by α1 > 0. In our non-
linear case, E(˜ Y |X) = F(X,θ) and misreporting leads to E(Y |X) = (1−α1)F(X,β)
(also see Hausman et al. (1998)).
In a nonlinear model, the misreporting parameter α1 could in principle be
identiﬁed, which it cannot be in a linear model. In practice, though, our estimation
procedure could not recover an estimate of α1, possibly because the shape of F(X,θ)
is close to linear over the relevant range. Nevertheless, from our estimation with
alternative values of α1, we learn that the magnitude of the bias in the estimated
coeﬃcients is not large for wide range of potential misreporting values, indicating
that our estimated impact of beliefs on risky behavior is fairly robust to misreporting
26The transcripts are available online at http://www.malawi.pop.upenn.edu/Level%203/Malawi
/level3 malawi qualmobilemen.htm)
24(see Tables 9a and 9b).27
5.4.2 Additional Regressors
In Table 10, we further investigate how our results are aﬀected by the inclusion of
additional covariates, namely reports on past behavior and perceived local HIV preva-
lence.
In the theoretical model of section 3, past behavior only inﬂuenced current
behavior through the updating of beliefs. However, it could conceivably have an in-
dependent eﬀect on current behavior, for example, by aﬀecting search costs for ﬁnding
extramarital partners. In Tables 10a-b we display coeﬃcient estimates obtained when
lagged behavior is included as an additional covariate. The inclusion of this variable
has little eﬀect on our estimated coeﬃcients on beliefs.
Our previous estimations also assumed that perceived risk of HIV infection
are held constant by inclusion of individual random eﬀects. Actual local prevalence
rates were fairly stable from 2006 to 2008, but it is possible that individuals’ beliefs
about prevalence varied over time. For these reasons, we estimated an additional
speciﬁcation that includes past behavior and perceived local prevalence as additional
covariates. The variable used to measure perceived local prevalence rate is the re-
spondents’ answer to the following question: “If we took a group of 10 people from
this area-just normal people who you found working in the ﬁelds or in homes-how
many of them do you think would now have HIV/AIDS?” We notice that the average
perceived prevalence is substantially above the prevalence in our sample, raising some
concerns about this variable. In addition, the perceived infection risk is also aﬀected
by the perceived likelihood of contamination from a sexual encounter. The inclusion
of this variable complicates our estimation procedure some, because the cells used
in the estimation now need to be constructed using these additional covariates. We
base the new cells on quartiles of perceived prevalence, but the average number of
27In principle, the misreporting could also depend on covariates, although this would complicate
the estimation procedure.
25individuals per cell still drops from 21 to less than 10 once prevalence is included.
The estimated eﬀect of beliefs on risky behavior is nevertheless still negative once
prevalence is added and the coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant in the linear speciﬁcation.
6 Counterfactual Simulations of Changing Beliefs
on HIV Transmission Rate
In this section, we use our estimates to evaluate the eﬀects of a hypothetical policy
intervention that makes individuals better informed about their own HIV status, ei-
ther because their beliefs are more responsive to testing results and/or because more
individuals get tested. Traditional epidemiological models characterize the spread
of diseases by diﬀerential equation systems representing the ﬂow of individuals be-
tween susceptibility and infectivity. For a review of SI (Susceptible-Infective) or SIR
(Susceptible-Infective-Recovered) models, see Anderson and May (1991) or Hethcote
(2000). We present a simpliﬁed version of these kinds of models in Appendix B that
we use to simulate the eﬀect of increasing the responsiveness of beliefs about own
HIV status to HIV test results on the population HIV transmission rate.
In these models, a crucial ingredient is the rate at which individuals are infected
by the disease. For HIV, Hyman et al. (2001) assume that the (annual) transmission
rate λ depends on the number of partners (r), the proportion of infected partners
(I) and the probability of infection by an infected partner (β(r)). The probability
of infection depends on the average number of contacts with a given partner (c(r)),
which can vary with the number of partners. We follow Hyman et al. [21] and assume




With one partner per year, the above equation implies 105 encounters in a year,
roughly two per week. As the number of partners increases, the number of encounters
26per partner asymptotes to one. Using information on frequency of sexual contacts
reported in 2006, we conﬁrmed that the number of contacts per partner does in fact
decay in the data as the number of partners increases.
We also follow Hyman et al.(2001) in assuming that the probability of infection
from an infected partner is
β(r) = 1 − (1 − ξ)
c(r)
where ξ is the probability of infection from a single contact with an HIV-positive
individual which we assume to be 0.1% (see footnote 12).
Lastly, we adapt the model by assuming that infected and uninfected individ-
uals may have a diﬀerent numbers of sexual partners (rI and rU, respectively). In
this SI model, the probability that an uninfected individual becomes infected (the
transmission rate) during a given year is
λ = rUβ(rU)
rII
rII + rU(1 − I)
This probability is equal to the product of the number partners an uninfected per-
son has (rU), the probability of infection per partner (given the number of partners)
(β(rU)) and the probability that a random partner is infected (given by the ratio
above). We use as baseline the probabilities of extra-marital aﬀairs and the average
number of sexual partners derived from the 2006 wave of the survey.28 For that year,
the probability of having an extramarital aﬀair was 7.23% for HIV-negative individ-
uals and 7.69% for HIV-positive individuals. Conditional on having an extra marital
aﬀair, the (average) reported number of partners was 3.22 for HIV-negative people
and 3.33 for HIV-positive people. Conditional on not having an extra marital aﬀair,
the (average) number of partners (wives) was 1.3 for HIV-negative individuals and
28The sample used for estimating the number of partners and the probability of extramarital aﬀairs
is all married men who are interviewed and tested for HIV in 2006, which is 841 men, a somewhat
larger sample than that used in estimating the panel data model. 39 men are HIV positive and
the remainder negative. A limitation of the analysis is that it is based on married males, so we are
implicitly assuming that the average behavior of married males extends to their sexual partners.
271.26 for HIV-positive individuals (recall that some men in our sample have multiple
wives). The number of partners for an uninfected person (rU) is then taken to be
rU = E(#partners|aﬀair,U)×P(aﬀair|U)+E(#partners|no aﬀair,U)×(1−P(aﬀair|U))
and rI is deﬁned analogously. Under these assumptions, an uninfected individual
has 87.7 contacts per partner on average in a given year. We take the proportion of
infected individuals to be 8%, roughly the prevalence rate in our sample and in line
with other reported numbers for rural Malawi. The probability of infection for an
infected individual can be calculated as λ = 0.955%.
We perform two counterfactual experiments. First we assume that all individ-
uals get tested and fully adjust their beliefs upon receiving the results. As previously
noted, many individuals currently do not revise their beliefs in a way that reﬂects their
test results.29 We explore how increasing the responsiveness of beliefs to test results
would alter the population HIV transmission rate. Under our simulation, those that
receive positive results (8% of the sample) revise their beliefs to “10 beans” whereas
those that receive a negative result revise their beliefs to “zero beans”. We assume
a baseline belief corresponding to “two beans”. According to Table 8, the marginal
eﬀect of these changes is to decrease the probability of an extra-marital aﬀair for the
positive individuals in 2006 by 5.1 percentage points and to increase the probability of
an extra-marital aﬀair for the negative individuals in 2006 by 8.5 percentage points.
The new transmission rate is then λ = 0.853%, which is lower than the initial rate of
0.953%.30
With full belief revision, the pool of sexual partners is improved and the likeli-
hood of contact with an infected individual is reduced. This happens for two reasons.
First, HIV-positives decrease their number of partners which reduces the probability
of having an encounter with a positive person. Second, HIV-negatives increase their
number of partners, which improves the pool of potential contacts but also increases
29See, for example, the evidence provide by Delavande and Kohler (2009b).
30If α is not zero and there is misreporting in extra-marital aﬀairs, our estimates are lower bounds
and the reduction would be even higher.
28the population at risk for becoming infected. Our results provide some support for
the mechanisms discussed in Kremer (1994) and Kremer and Morcom (1998) in the
context of a traditional SIR model with heterogeneity in the number of partners as
we have here.
As an alternative, consider a policy that concentrates resources on increas-
ing the responsiveness of HIV-positive individuals only, for example, an HIV testing
program that is targeted narrowly at persons who are likely to be positive. Our sim-
ulations ﬁnd that such a policy also obtains a reduction in the transmission rate, but
not by as much. That is, if we assume that upon testing HIV-positive individuals
increase their belief from “two beans” to “ten beans” but HIV-negative individuals
maintain their beliefs, the probability of infection is 0.89%. The pool of sexual part-
ners improves as infected individuals reduce their sexual activity, but not as much as
when uninfected also increase their sexual activity. The results are summarized on
Table 11.
These results are mainly illustrative of how the estimates from the dynamic
panel data model can be used to study the eﬀects of policy interventions. A full
assessment of the eﬀectiveness of alternative policies would require consideration of
costs as well as the beneﬁts in terms of life-years saved and possibly also of the
distributional eﬀects.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between beliefs about HIV status and risky
sexual behavior in the form of extra-marital aﬀairs using a unique panel dataset
from Malawi that includes detailed longitudinal measures of subjective beliefs and
behaviors. The individuals in our sample were given the opportunity to get tested for
HIV in 2004, 2006 and 2008 and most availed themselves of the testing opportunities,
often multiple times. Our analysis sample exhibits substantial revisions in beliefs
over the time period covered by the data collection, although the changes in reported
29beliefs do not always accord with test results.
Simple cross-sectional correlations suggest that individuals who believe they
have a higher likelihood of being HIV positive engage in riskier behaviors. These
correlations do not have a causal interpretation, though, because of unobserved het-
erogeneity and because behavior is likely to be correlated over time, with beliefs being
updated to reﬂect additional risk posed by lagged behaviors. In a panel data setting,
this correlation between current beliefs and lagged behaviors leads to a violation of
strict exogeneity. To control for endogeneity of the belief variable as well as for
individual unobserved heterogeneity, we use an approach developed by Arellano and
Carrasco (2003). Our estimates indicate that downward revisions in beliefs lead to a
higher propensity to engage in extramarital aﬀairs and that upward revisions in be-
liefs lead to a lower propensity.31 We also modiﬁed the Arellano and Carrasco (2003)
estimator to incorporate reporting error, along the lines of Hausman, Abbrevaya and
Scott-Morton (1998). Our empirical estimates are fairly robust to measurement error
in a wide range (0-60%).
Our simulation of the eﬀects of making individuals better informed about their
own HIV status, using a prototypical epidemiological model of disease transmission
calibrated to the Malawi data, showed that an intervention along these lines would
reduce the HIV transmission rate, despite some increase in risk-taking behavior in
the HIV-negative population. This suggests that policy interventions that make test-
ing more credible and improve the availability and take-up of testing are likely to
reduce the HIV transmission rate. Such policies might include informational cam-
paigns, more frequent or more easily available testing, improved testing methods and
providing cash incentives to get tested or to pick up test results.
31As previously noted, though, most of the variation in our data from which the parameter is
identiﬁed comes from upward variations in beliefs.
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Malawi. Malawi is a landlocked country in Southern Africa with a population of
about 13.5 million. In the UNDP’s 2007 Human Development Index, combining data
collected in 2005 on health, education and standards of living, Malawi was ranked
164 out of 177 countries, with a rank of 1 being the most developed. Malawi’s
GDP per capita was ranked 174, at US$667, making Malawi a poor country even by
Sub-Saharan standards. Malawi is one of the countries worst hit by the HIV/AIDS
epidemic with an estimated prevalence rate of 12% in the overall population and
10.8% in the rural areas (Demographic Health Survey, 2004).
The Northern region, where Rumphi is located, is primarily patrilineal with patrilo-
cal residence. Almost all of its population is Christian, predominantly protestant.
This region, which has the smallest population, is also the least densely populated
and least developed in terms of roads and other infrastructure. However, it has the
highest rates of literacy and educational attainment. The most commonly spoken
language in the region is chiTumbuka, the language of the Tumbuka tribe, which is
the biggest tribe in the area. The northern region has the highest rates of polygamy,
but the lowest HIV prevalence for men age 15-19, estimated to be around 5.4%. The
HIV prevalence for similar age women is higher than that of the central region (De-
partment of Health Services). The Central region, where Mchinji is, is predominantly
Christian as well, with a mix of Catholics and protestants. The largest group in the
region is the Chewa tribe, which is the largest ethnic group in all of Malawi. Its
language, chiChewa, is the most spoken in the region as well as in the whole country.
(English is nevertheless the oﬃcial language.) The Chewa tribe historically used a
matrilineal lineage system with matrilocal residence. Today, the lineage system is
less rigid, with mixed matrilocal and patrilocal residence (Reniers, 2003). The Cen-
tral Region is home to Lilongwe, the capital city which in recent years has become
the biggest city in the country. Finally, the Southern region, where Balaka is, pre-
36dominantly uses matrilineal lineage systems with matrilocal residence. It has a large
Muslim population, concentrated mainly in the north-east part of the region around
the southern rim of Lake Malawi. The Southern Region has the largest population
and is the most densely populated. It has the lowest rates of literacy and percentage
of people ever attending school.
MDICP Sampling. The MDICP collected data from three out of Malawi’s 28 dis-
tricts, one in each of the three administrative regions. The districts are Rumphi
in the north, Mchinji in the center, and Balaka in the south. The original sample,
drawn in 1998, consisted of 1,541 ever married women aged 15-49 and 1,065 of their
husbands. The consequent waves targeted the same respondents and added any new
spouses. In 2004, 769 adolescents and young adults, aged 14-28 were added to the
sample, out of which 411 were never married. The original sample wasn’t designed to
be representative of rural Malawi, but is similar in many socioeconomic characteris-
tics to the rural samples in the Malawi Demographic and Health Surveys, which are
representative (Watkins et al. 2003, Anglewicz et al. 2006).
Belief Data. The MDICP elicited the beliefs of the respondents about own infec-
tion status using a novel bean counting approach. Each respondent was given a cup,
a plate, and 10 beans. The interviewer then read the following text:
I will ask you several questions about the chance or likelihood that certain
events are going to happen. There are 10 beans in the cup. I would like
you to choose some beans out of these 10 beans and put them in the plate
to express what you think the likelihood or chance is of a speciﬁc event
happening. One bean represents one chance out of 10. If you do not put
any beans in the plate, it means you are sure that the event will NOT
happen. As you add beans, it means that you think the likelihood that
the event happens increases. For example, if you put one or two beans, it
means you think the event is not likely to happen but it is still possible.
37If you pick 5 beans, it means that it is just as likely it happens as it does
not happen (ﬁfty-ﬁfty). If you pick 6 beans, it means the event is slightly
more likely to happen than not to happen. If you put 10 beans in the
plate, it means you are sure the event will happen. There is not right or
wrong answer, I just want to know what you think.
Let me give you an example. Imagine that we are playing Bawo. Say,
when asked about the chance that you will win, you put 7 beans in the
plate. This means that you believe you would win 7 out of 10 games on
average if we play for a long time.
After this introduction, each respondent was asked to choose the number of beans
that reﬂect the likelihood of common events such as going to the market in the follow-
ing two weeks or a death of a newborn in the community. For these questions, if the
respondents chose 0 or 10 beans they were prompted: “Are you sure this event will
almost surely (not) happen?” The respondents were not prompted for the following
questions.
The variable used in this analysis to represent beliefs about own infection is the
respondents’ chosen number of beans when they are asked to: “Pick the number of
beans that reﬂect how likely you think it is that you are infected with HIV/AIDS
now.”
Deﬁnition of risky behavior variables. Our measurements for risky behavior were
taken from the “Sexual Behaviors” section of the survey. In the section, the re-
spondents were asked their number of sexual partners and to name up to three of
their partners in the prior 12 months, including spouses, and a series of questions
about the partnerships were asked. We consider a man to have had an extramarital
aﬀair if he reported any relationship with a woman who is not his wife. For the rare
cases in which a man has three or more wives, the extramarital aﬀairs variable equals
38one if the number of reported sexual partners in the prior 12 months exceeds the
number of wives.
Appendix B
This appendix presents a simpliﬁed version of the SI model in Hyman et al. (2001).
As in that article, we describe here a version where the number of partners for infected
and uninfected persons is the same, rU = rI though the model can be easily extended
to accommodate heterogeneity and we allow for heterogeneity in our simulations
reported in section 6. Kremer(1994) and Kremer and Morcom (1998) considers a
similar model with heterogeneity in the number of partners but no variation in sexual
contacts as the number of sexual partners increases.
The system starts with a proportion U0 of uninfected (or susceptible) individuals. At
a rate λ (which depends on the proportion of infected individuals) individuals move
from uninfected to infected. Uninfected individuals are also born and die (of causes




=  (U0 − U) − λU
dI
dt
= λU − (  + ν)I
It is possible to add a third group of people who leave the set of individuals at risk
(i.e. are no longer sexually active) but are still alive. In this model, it can be shown
that
λ = rβI
where β is deﬁned as in section 6. If rU = rI, this formula corresponds to the
one given in section 6. Hyman et al. (2001) study versions of this model with
heterogeneous infectivity. Like Kremer (1994) and Kremer and Morcom (1998) we
focus on heterogeneity in the number of partners. For further examples of SI and SIR
models, see Anderson and May (1991) or Hethcote (2000).
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Table 1  
HIV test results in 2004 and reported beliefs  
of own probability of infection in 2006
(a) 
  HIV test outcome in 2004 
 
Reported belief category in 2006  Negative  Positive 




  low probability 
 
77  6 
  medium probability 
 
12  2 
  high probability 
 
15  4 
(a) Sample of males who got tested in 2004 and picked up the  




 Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for males 
Interviewed in 2006 and 2008 MDICP samples 
Variable  Mean  Std. Deviation 
Age (in 2008)  46.126  11.511 
Muslim  0.230  0.421 
Christian  0.736  0.442 
No school  0.105  0.307 
Primary education only  0.715  0.452 
Secondary education  0.165  0.372 
Higher education  0.124  0.111 
Reside in Balaka  0.311  0.463 
Reside in Rumphi  0.356  0.479 
Reside in Mchinji  0.332  0.471 
Percent polygamous (2006)  0.159  0.366 
Percent polygamous (2008)  0.180  0.385 
Number of children (2006)  5.325  2.712 
Number of children (in 2008)  5.571  2.656 
Number of children not reported (in 2006)  0.041  0.199 
Number of children not reported (in 2008)  0.000  0.000 
Metal roof 2006  0.159  0.366 
Metal roof 2008  0.206  0.405 
Believe that own prob of HIV is zero in 2006  0.822  0.383 
Believe that own prob of HIV is low in 2006  0.133  0.340 
Believe that own prob of HIV is medium in 2006  0.019  0.136 
Believe that own prob of HIV is high in 2006  0.027  0.162 
Believe that own prob of HIV is zero in 2008  0.548  0.498 
Believe that own prob of HIV is low in 2008  0.351  0.478 
Believe that own prob of HIV is medium in 2008  0.076  0.266 
Believe that own prob of HIV is high in 2008  0.025  0.155 
Subjective probability assigned to being HIV 
positive    
     (number of beans) (in 2006) 
0.664  1.657 
Subjective probability assigned to being HIV 
positive    
     (number of beans) (in 2008) 
1.276  1.693 
Subjective probability assigned to spouse being HIV 
positive (2006) 
0.620  1.495 
Subjective probability assigned to spouse being HIV 
positive (2008) 
1.383  1.890 
Report extramarital affair in last 12 months in 2006  0.043  0.204 
Report extramarital affair in last 12 months in 2008  0.105  0.307 
Took HIV test in 2006  0.936  0.245 
Took HIV test in 2008  0.829  0.377 






Average subjective belief of being HIV positive, reported by  
Bean measure, within coarse belief categories 
  Average belief measure  
(number of beans) 
Believe that HIV probability is zero in 2006  0.18 
Believe that HIV probability is low in 2006  1.72 
Believe that probability is medium in 2006  4.48 






Probabilities of engaging in extramarital affairs in 2006 and 2008
 a) 
(number of observations in parentheses) 
  No extramarital affair in last 
12 months in 2008 
Extramarital affair in last 
12 months in 2008 
No extramarital affair 
in last 12 months in 
2006 
 
86.2% (418)  9.5% (46) 
Extramarital affair in 
last 12 months in 
2006 
3.3% (16)  1.0% (5) 
(a)  Sample of males interviewed in the 2006 and 2008 surveys.  
  
Table 5 
Probit estimation exploring the determinants of extramarital affairs in 2006 and 2008 
(Std error in parentheses) 
  Specification 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 














Believe HIV prob is low






…  0.174 
(0.146) 











…  0.023 
(0.240) 






























































Resides in Balaka 















































…  … 








…  … 
Metal Roof  … 
 








Year Dummy  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.038  0.034  0.087  0.087  0.0855  0.0846 
Number of observations  970  967  958  955  958  955 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
† The omitted categories are:  Secondary school or some years of higher education, resides in Mchinji, believe HIV prob is 
zero  
Table 6a 
Cell sizes for indicated bean ranges and age grouped in quintiles 
Cell  Age 2008
†  Bean 2006 
Extra-Marital 
Affair 2004  cell_size  Total 
1  5  0  No  72   
2  4  0  No  68   
3  3  0  No  67   
4  2  0  No  64   
5  1  0  No  56   
6  1  2-10  No  18   
7  1  0  Yes  17   
8  2  2-10  No  12   
9  3  2-10  No  12   
10  3  1  No  11   
11  4  2-10  No  11   
12  2  0  Yes  9   
13  3  0  Yes  9   
14  1  1  No  7   
15  2  1  No  7   
16  2  2-10  Yes  6   
17  4  1  No  6   
18  4  0  Yes  5   
19  5  1  No  5   
20  5  2-10  No  5   
21  1  1  Yes  4   
22  1  2-10  Yes  4   
23  5  0  Yes  4  479 
24  5  2-10  Yes  2   
25  2  1  Yes  1   
26  3  2-10  Yes  1   
27  4  2-10  Yes  1   
28  5  1  Yes  1  485 
      †For Age 2008, a value of 1 represents the first quintile, 2 represents the second  
        quintile, and so on. 
  
Table 6b 








2004  cell_size  Total 
1  5  0  no  72   
2  4  0  no  68   
3  3  0  no  67   
4  2  0  no  64   
5  1  0  no  56   
6  1  0  yes  17   
7  3  1  no  11   
8  2  2-4  no  10   
9  1  2-4  no  9   
10  1  5-10  no  9   
11  2  0  yes  9   
12  3  0  yes  9   
13  3  2-4  no  8   
14  4  2-4  no  8   
15  1  1  no  7   
16  2  1  no  7   
17  4  1  no  6   
18  4  0  yes  5   
19  5  1  no  5   
20  1  1  yes  4   
21  1  2-4  yes  4   
22  3  5-10  no  4   
23  5  0  yes  4   
24  5  2-4  no  4   
25  2  2-4  yes  3   
26  2  5-10  yes  3   
27  4  5-10  no  3  476 
28  2  5-10  no  2   
29  5  2-4  yes  2   
30  2  1  yes  1   
31  3  2-4  yes  1   
32  4  5-10  yes  1   
33  5  1  yes  1   
34  5  5-10  no  1  485 
   †For Age 2008, a value of 1 represents the first quintile, 2  





Estimated coefficients for effects of beliefs on the propensity to engage in extramarital affairs 
Linear specification 
Bean Aggregation 





GMM   Constant   Age  Belief 




















      * p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
(a)  The estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation schemes used in implementing the 






Estimated coefficients for effects of beliefs on the propensity to engage in extramarital affairs 
Specification including quadratic terms in age and beliefs 
Bean 
Aggregation 





































      * p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
(a)  The estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation schemes used in implementing the 
GMM procedure. The age categories are aggregated into quintiles.  
 
   
Table 8a.  
Average marginal effects implied by estimated coefficients in Table 7a  
Linear Specification 
  Bean Aggregation
(a) 






(b)  From  To 
0  10  -0.137  -0.305  -0.174  -0.364 
1  10  -0.081  -0.204  -0.077  -0.227 
2  10  -0.051  -0.132  -0.049  -0.137 
3  10  -0.035  -0.082  -0.038  -0.071 
4  10  -0.024  -0.046  -0.030  -0.032 
5  10  -0.017  -0.023  -0.023  -0.011 
6  10  -0.012  -0.011  -0.017  -0.006 
7  10  -0.008  -0.006  -0.013  -0.003 
8  10  -0.004  -0.003  -0.009  -0.001 
9  10  -0.001  -0.001  -0.004  0.000 
1  0  0.056  0.101  0.096  0.137 
2  0  0.085  0.173  0.124  0.227 
3  0  0.101  0.223  0.135  0.292 
4  0  0.113  0.259  0.143  0.332 
5  0  0.120  0.283  0.150  0.353 
6  0  0.125  0.294  0.156  0.358 
7  0  0.129  0.299  0.160  0.361 
8  0  0.133  0.302  0.164  0.363 
9  0  0.135  0.304  0.169  0.364 
(a)  The estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation schemes 
used in implementing the GMM procedure. The age categories are always 
aggregated into quintiles.  
(b)  The marginal effects are obtained for each individual in the 2006 and 2008 
samples and are averaged across individuals to obtain the marginal effect 
estimates reported in the table.  
Table 8b. Marginal Effects 
Specification including quadratic terms in age and beliefs 
  Bean Aggregation
(a) 






(b)  From  To 
0  10  -0.154  -0.344  -0.137  -0.330 
1  10  -0.121  -0.293  -0.098  -0.272 
2  10  -0.071  -0.176  -0.061  -0.160 
3  10  -0.053  -0.107  -0.046  -0.091 
4  10  -0.046  -0.076  -0.039  -0.064 
5  10  -0.026  -0.027  -0.024  -0.016 
6  10  -0.021  -0.013  -0.020  -0.006 
7  10  -0.018  -0.009  -0.018  -0.003 
8  10  -0.012  -0.003  -0.012  -0.003 
9  10  -0.008  -0.002  -0.008  -0.003 
1  0  0.033  0.051  0.040  0.058 
2  0  0.083  0.169  0.076  0.170 
3  0  0.101  0.237  0.091  0.238 
4  0  0.108  0.268  0.098  0.266 
5  0  0.128  0.318  0.113  0.313 
6  0  0.133  0.331  0.117  0.324 
7  0  0.135  0.335  0.119  0.326 
8  0  0.142  0.341  0.126  0.327 
9  0  0.146  0.342  0.130  0.327 
(a)  The estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation schemes 
used in implementing the GMM procedure. The age categories are always 
aggregated into quintiles.  
(b)  The marginal effects are obtained for each individual in the 2006 and 2008 
samples and are averaged across individuals to obtain the marginal effect 
estimates reported in the table.  
 
Table 9a 
Estimated coefficients for effects of beliefs on the propensity to  
engage in extramarital affairs for varying levels of misreporting 
Linear specification 
  Bean Aggregation
(a)  






Age  Belief  Age  Belief 
0.00  1.373  -1.552  2.240  -3.168 
0.05  1.381  -1.568  2.256  -3.199 
0.10  1.390  -1.584  2.273  -3.232 
0.15  1.400  -1.602  2.292  -3.267 
0.20  1.411  -1.621  2.313  -3.304 
0.25  1.423  -1.641  2.335  -3.344 
0.30  1.437  -1.663  2.359  -3.387 
0.35  1.452  -1.687  2.387  -3.434 
0.40  1.470  -1.713  2.418  -3.486 
0.45  1.492  -1.743  2.457  -3.546 
0.50  1.530  -1.778  2.531  -3.645 
0.55  1.557  -1.816  2.570  -3.706 
0.60  1.591  -1.863  2.617  -3.773 
(b)  The estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation 
schemes used in implementing the GMM procedure. The age 




Estimated coefficients for effects of beliefs on the propensity to  
engage in extramarital affairs for varying levels of misreporting 
Specification including quadratic terms in age and beliefs 
  Beans 0,1,2-10  Beans 0,1,2-4,5-10 
α1 
Coefficients  Coefficients 









0.00  2.179  0.303  0.008  -1.361  2.395  0.144  0.008  -1.461 
0.05  2.204  0.305  0.008  -1.372  2.422  0.145  0.008  -1.474 
0.10  2.231  0.308  0.008  -1.385  2.450  0.144  0.008  -1.487 
0.15  2.259  0.310  0.008  -1.398  2.479  0.144  0.008  -1.501 
0.20  2.289  0.312  0.007  -1.412  2.511  0.143  0.008  -1.515 
0.25  2.321  0.315  0.007  -1.426  2.545  0.141  0.008  -1.531 
0.30  2.356  0.317  0.007  -1.442  2.582  0.138  0.008  -1.547 
0.35  2.394  0.318  0.007  -1.459  2.623  0.133  0.008  -1.564 
0.40  2.436  0.318  0.007  -1.477  2.668  0.124  0.008  -1.581 
0.45  2.483  0.317  0.007  -1.495  2.721  0.104  0.008  -1.597 
0.50  2.555  0.297  0.007  -1.501  2.818  -0.007  0.007  -1.588 
0.55  2.607  0.298  0.007  -1.528  2.870  -0.004  0.007  -1.615 
0.60  2.667  0.294  0.007  -1.559  2.930  -0.006  0.007  -1.642 
  Robustness: Beliefs and Extramarital Affairs Regressions 
 
 
Table 10a. (No quadratic terms)
 (a) 
Bean Group 
Sample  Coefficients 





















































(0.280)   
-0.064 
(0.204) 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
(a)  The estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation schemes used in implementing the GMM 








Sample  Coefficients     


























   































   















* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
(a)  The estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation schemes used in implementing the GMM procedure. The 
age categories are aggregated into quintiles and the perceived prevalence, into quartiles.  Table 11a  
Counterfactual Experiments on Increased 
Responsiveness of Beliefs to Testing
 
Baseline Parameters  Value 
Pr(Affair | Uninfected)  7.23% 
 
 Pr(Affair | Infected) 
 
7.69% 
 E(# Partners | Affair, Uninfected) 
 
3.22 
 E(# Partners | Affair, Infected) 
 
3.33 
 E(# Partners | No Affair, Uninfected) 
 
1.3 
 E(# Partners | No Affair, Infected) 
 
1.26 
 I (Prevalence Rate)  8% 
   
ξ (Infection prob from single contact)   0.1% 
   
 
Table 11b 
Counterfactual Experiments on Increased 
Responsiveness of Beliefs to Testing
 
λ (Probability of Infection) 
Baseline  0.955% 
Full Belief Revision (U and I)  0.853% 
Full Belief Revision (I only)  0.890% 
  
 
Figure 1: Belief Distribution (2006 and 2008) 
 
 
Figure 2: Bean Frequency Changes (= Relative Freq in 2008  
– Relative Freq in 2006) 
 